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VOLUME XIX MARCH, 1935 No. 4
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS ARISING FROM SERV-
ICE OF PROCESS ON FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
By MAURICE S. CULP*
T HE problems of serving process upon foreign corporations
arise out of the application and construction of statutes, exist-
ing in every state,' providing for such service. It is the object
of this study to make a careful analysis of the statutory provisions
for such service and discuss the procedural2 and constitutional
problems as they may arise under specific statutory provisions.
However, there are certain preliminary matters which must be
settled before process may be served upon the foreign corporation.
First, the foreign corporation must be "doing business" within the
state before it is amenable to service of process. The determina-
tion of "doing business" is a problem of infinite variety and diffi-
*Teaching and Research Assistant, University of Michigan Law School,
Ann Arbor, Michigan.
"This article is intended to cover only personal actions brought against
foreign corporations, and does not propose to discuss the problems raised
by attempts to serve process upon corporations engaged in interstate com-
merce. On this problem see Furst v. Brewster, (1931) 282 U. S. 493, 51
Sup. Ct. 295, 75 L. Ed. 478. This problem has been carefully treated else-
where. See Farrier, Suits Against Foreign Corporations as a Burden on
Interstate Commerce, (1933) 17 MiNNEsorA LAW RnPvw 381.
2A question closely related to service of process, though beyond the
scope of this article, is that of venue. The chief constitutional difficulty
here is whether the discrimination is a violation of the equal protection of
the laws. If there is no valid basis for the discrimination, the venue statutes
will fail to meet the test. See Power Manufacturing Co. v. Saunders, (1927)
274 U. S. 490, 47 Sup. Ct. 678, 71 L Ed. 1165; Dickerson C. McClung v.
Pulitzer Publishing Co., (1919) 279 Mo. 370, 214 S. W. 193; Dublin Mill
& Elevator Co. v. Cornelius, (Te. Civ. App. 1928) 5 S. W. (2d) 1027;
State ex rel. Twin City and Southern Bus Co. v. District Court of Otter
Tail County et al., (1929) 178 Minn. 19, 225 N. W. 915, noted (1929) 14
MINNESOrA LAW Ravmw 83. As to whether a refusal to grant changes of
venue to corporations is a valid discrimination, see Morrimac Veneer Co. v.
McCalip, (1922) 129 Miss. 671, 92 So. 817. Unreasonable venue provisions
coupled with faulty provision for giving notice may also operate to deny
due process of law. See Jefferson Fire Insurance Co. v. Brackin, (1913)
140 Ga. 637, 79 S. E. 467. Hansell, The Proper Forum for Suits Against
Foreign Corporations, (1927) 27 Col. L. Rev. 12.
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culty a discussion of which is beyond the scope of an article dealing
with the problems of serving process on foreign corporations.3
Each case has to be considered upon its own facts, and there is no
general rule by which "doing business ' 4 may be resolved in every
case. The nearest approach to a general rule is the frequently
quoted statement that the business transacted must in manner
and extent warrant the inference that it is present with some degree
of permanence and continuity.
Of like complexity but of far less serious consequences with
respect to the ability to serve process are the controversies con-
cerning the "correct" or "best" basis for a state's power over
3The cases dealing with the problem are legion. It is clear that the
corporation must be doing business. St. Clair v. Cox, (1882) 106 U. S.
350, 359, 1 Sup. Ct. 1002, 38 L. Ed. 936; Goldey v. Morning News, (1895)
156 U. S. 518, 15 Sup. Ct. 559, 39 L. Ed. 517; Riverside and Dan River
Cotton Mills v. Menefee, (1915) 237 U. S. 189, 35 Sup. Ct. 579, 59 L.
Ed. 910.
A few cases will show the diversity of fact situations presented. See
Green v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry., (1907) 205 U. S. 530, 533, 27 Sup. Ct. 595,
51 L. Ed. 916; St. Louis Southwestern Railway Co. of Texas v. Alexander,(1913) 227 U. S. 218, 227, 33 Sup. Ct. 245, 57 L. Ed. 486; Philadelphia &
Reading Railway Co. v. McKibbin, (1917) 243 U. S. 264, 265, 37 Sup. Ct.
280, 61 L. Ed. 710; Cannon Manufacturing Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co.,(1925) 267 U. S. 333, 45 Sup. Ct. 250, 69 L. Ed. 634; Neely v. Philadelphia
Inquirer Co., (1932) 61 App. D. C. 334, 62 F. (2d) 861; Southeastern Dis-
tributing Co. v. Nordyke & Marmon Co., (1924) 159 Ga. 150, 125 S. E. 171.
There is, however, something of a general principle running through
the cases, although its application to specific fact situations may be unpre-
dictable. In St. Louis S. W. Ry. v. Alexander, (1913) 227 U. S. 218, 227,
33 Sup. Ct. 245, 57 L. Ed. 486, the Supreme Court summarized its method
of determining the fact of "doing business:"
"We reach the conclusion that this case is to be decided upon the prin-
ciples which have heretofore prevailed in determining whether a foreign
corporation is doing business within the district in such sense as to subject
it to suit therein. This court has decided each case of this character upon
the facts brought before it and has laid down no all-embracing rule by
which it may be determined what constitutes the doing of business by a
foreign corporation in such manner as to subject it to a given jurisdiction.
In a general way it may be said that the business must be such in character
and extent as to warrant the inference that the corporation has subjected
itself to the jurisdiction and laws of the district in which it is served and
in which it is bound to appear when a proper agent has been served with
process."
4This subject has been very fully treated in legal periodicals. For sonie of
the discussions see Osborne, Arising Out of Business Done in the State,(1923) 7 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 380; Isaacs, An Analysis of Doing
Business, (1925) 25 Col. L. Rev. 1018; Rothschild, Jurisdiction of Foreign
Corporations in Personam, (1930) 17 Va. L. Rev. 129, 135 ff.; Raymond,
Jurisdiction over a Foreign Corporation Doing Business within the State,(1931) 9 Tex. L. Rev. 410, 422; Farrier, Jurisdiction over Foreign Cor-
porations, (1933) 17 MINNESOTA LAW REVlEW 270; Comments and notes:(1916) 14 Mich. L. Rev. 588; (1921) 31 Yale L. J. 205; (1927) 14 Va. L.
Rev. 133; (1930) 15 Iowa L. Rev. 204.
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foreign corporations.' These theories do not require further dis-
cussion except in so far as they may influence the decision of
questions relating to the service of process upon foreign corpora-
tions. If the foreign corporation is "doing business" within the
state, it is subject to the process of the state's courts regardless of
the particular theory of judicial power over foreign corporations
employed.
Several theories have been supported by the courts. The first
and oldest was based upon the idea that a state may either ex-
clude a foreign corporation or admit it for the purpose of tran-
sacting business therein; that in admitting a foreign corporation
it may lay down the conditions of admission to which the corpora-
tion must submit before it may do business.' This is the idea of
'complete and arbitrary power over admission, sometimes called the
"consent" theory. Equally well supported by precedent is the
"presence" theory which becomes operative only when the corpora-
tion is in a position where it may be considered as present within
the state.7 As the writers indicate, neither of these theories will
explain all of the cases. Other theories have been proposed.
Prominent among them is the "reasonable exercise of jurisdiction"
or "submission" theory which means that a corporation by coming
into a state is amenable to the reasonable police power of the
state." Other theories which have been suggested are based upon
5The bases of "jurisdiction"-the power of a state to subject the foreign
corporation to the process of its courts-have been adequately and ably
discussed by other writers. See Cahill, Jurisdiction over Foreign Corpora-
tions and Individuals Who Carry on Business within the Territory, (1917)
30 Harv. L. Rev. 676; Fead, Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations, (1926)
24 Mich. L. Rev. 633; Bullington, Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations,
(1928) 6 N. C. L. Rev. 147; Rothschild, Jurisdiction of Foreign Corpora-
tions in Personam, (1930) 17 Va. L. Rev. 129; Raymond, Jurisdiction over
a Foreign Corporation Doing Business within the State, (1931) 9 Tex.
L. Rev. 410; Farrier, Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations, (1933) 17
MINNESoTA LAW REvIEw 270; Stimson, Jurisdiction over Foreign Cor-
porations, (1933) 18 St. Louis L. Rev. 195; Willis, Corporations and the
United States Constitution, (1934) 8 U. of Cin. L. Rev. 1; Comments:
(1929) 77 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 1010; (1931) 79 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 956, 1119.
See Henderson, The Position of Foreign Corporations in American Con-
stitutional Law 89 ff., 104 ff.
OSee Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, (1855) 18 How. (U.S.) 404. 15
L. Ed. 451; Horn Silver Mining Co. v. New York, (1892) 143 .U. S. 305,
12 Sup. Ct. 403, 36 L. Ed. 164.
7See Green v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry., (1907) 205 U. S. 530, 27 Sup. Ct.
595, 51 L. Ed. 916; St. Louis S. W. R. Co. v. Alexander, (1913) 227 U. S.
218, 33 Sup. Ct. 245, 57 L. Ed. 486; Bank of America v. Whitney Bank,(19123) 261 U. S. 171, 43 Sup. Ct. 311, 67 L. Ed. 594.8See Smolik v. Philadelphia & Reading C. & I. Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1915)
222 Fed. 148; Farmers' & Merchants' Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, (D. C.
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the doing of an act which a state could forbid, upon propriety and
convenience,9 and upon acts on the part of agents or servants
within a state in behalf of a foreign corporation." In the last
analysis it seems that a theory which takes into account the con-
stitutional limitations and restraints upon the "unlimited" power
of a state over a foreign corporation must be based upon broad
concepts of public necessity and convenience which render the
exercise of judicial authority" over a foreign corporation reason-
able when its activity begins to have an important influence upon
the residents, and of the theories proposed the "reasonable regu-
lation" basis seems to be the most realistic and the best adapted
to withstand continuous attack. 12
There has been a progressive development in the enactment of
statutes in the several states providing for service of process upon
foreign corporations.1 3 Foreign insurance corporations have been
Ky. 1922) 286 Fed. 566, 588 ff. See Fead, Jurisdiction over Foreign Cor-
porations, (1926) 24 Mich. L. Rev. 633, 636; Bowers, Process and Service,
sec. 331.
"Willis, Corporations and the U. S. Constitution, (1934) 8 U. of Cin.
L. Rev. 1, 22; Farrier, Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations, (1933)
17 MINNESOTA LAW REviEw 270, 285, 286.
'
0 Stimson, Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations, (1933) 18 St. Louis
L. Rev. 195, states his theory as follows: "A foreign corporation is subject
to a sovereignty's jurisdiction whenever one or more of its agents or serv-
ants, acting in its behalf, is within that sovereignty's territory."
lIt should be borne in mind that the courts have not made any clear
pronouncement in favor of explaining state authority over foreign corpora-
tions upon the basis of ordinary legislative power. Sooner or later a clearer
recognition of this fact may be forced, particularly in the case of regula-
tion affecting corporations engaged in interstate commerce which, of course,
cannot be excluded, and of federally chartered corporations which may be
operating within a state but which cannot reasonably claim or be permitted
immunity from local suits unless they are in the discharge of a governmental
function of the federal government, in which case it is a matter for legislative
determination.
'
2 See Hinton, Substituted Service on Non-Residents, (1925) 20 111.
L. Rev. 1, 5; Shirley, Foreign Corporations-Service on Statutory Agent,
(1933) 11 Tex. L. Rev. 226, 232-233.
23Foreign Corporations generally: Alabama, Code (1928), secs. 7209,
9426; Arizona, Revised Code (1928) secs. 657, 659, 661; Arkansas, Statutes
(1927 supp.) sec. 1830, 1151, 1826, 1829; California Gen. Laws 1931, Act.
686, sec. 17, California, Statutes 1933, ch. 533, sec. 405, 406; Colorado,
Statutes (Courtright's Mills Annotated 1930), sec. 988; District of Colum-
bia Code, 1929, title 24, ch. 15, sec. 373; Connecticut, General Statutes 1930,
sees. 3489, 3490; Delaware Rev. Code 1915, sec. 2101a, 2101d, 2101e, 578,
605, 606, Delaware, Laws 1931, ch. 52, sec. 26, code No. 597; Florida, Gen.
Laws 1927, sec. 4251, 4256, 4257, 4259; Georgia, Code (Park's annotated
1914) secs. 2258, 2261; Idaho, Code Anno. 1932, sec. 29-502; Illinois, Rev.
Stat. (Cahill's 1933) ch. 32, sec. 113; Indiana, Stat. (Burns Annotated
1926) secs. 4913, 4923, 4924; Indiana, Statutes (Supp. 1929) sec. 4856.33,
4856.30 (5), (6); Iowa, Code 1931, sec. 11072, 8421 (6) ; Kansas, Rev.
Stat. (1923), ch. 17-501, 1203, Supplement (1933) ch. 17-509, 510, ch. 60-
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grouped separately from other foreign corporations and have
been regulated by separate statutes,14 but the service provisions of
2519 to 2522; Kentucky, Statutes (Carroll's 1930) sec. 571; Louisiana, Gen.
Statutes (Dart, 1932) secs. 1248, 1249, 1111 (e), 1250, 1251, 1252; Maine,
Rev. Stat. (1930) ch. 95, sec. 19, ch. 56, sec. 106; Maryland, Code Anno.(1924) art. 23, secs. 118, 119; Massachusetts, Anno. Laws 1933, cli. 223, sec.
38, 39, ch. 181, sec. 3, 3A, 4; Michigan, Comp. Laws 1929, secs. 14094, 14095,
14097; Minnesota, Stats. (Mason's 1927) secs. 9231-3, 4, 7493; Mississippi,
Code (1930) secs. 4140, 4166, 4167; Missouri, Rev. Stat. 1929, sec. 744, 4596,
4597; Montana, Rev. Codes 1929, secs. 9111, 9112, 9113, 9114, 9115, 9116;
Nebraska, Comp. Stat. 1929, ch. 20-413, ch. 24-1201, 1203; Nevada, Comp.
Laws 1929, secs. 8580, 8581; New Hampshire, Pub. Laws 1926, ch. 231, sec. 1,
6; New Jersey, Comp. Stat. (1910) sec. 97, 99; New Mexico Stats. 1929, ch.
32-196, 204; New York, Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1930) Bk. 22, sec. 210,
216 (e), (f), 217, 224, 225 (1, 2, 3, 4, Bk. 4, sec. 28, 145, 223, 224 (banking
law)) ; North Carolina, Code 1931, secs. 1494, 1137; North Dakota, Comp.
Laws 1913, sec. 5240; Ohio, Gen. Code (Throckmorton's 1930) secs. 179, 181,
10244, 11288; Qklahoma, Stats. 1931, secs. 126, 128, 130, 133, const. sec. 43;
Oregon, Code Anno. 1930, ch. 25-1101, 1102, 1202; Pennsylvasia, Stat. (Pur-
don's Anno. Per. ed.) Title 15 sec. 3142; Rhode Island, Gen. Laws 1923,
sec. 2092, 2094, 3530 (3), 3535; South Carolina, Code 1932, sec. 7765, sec.
434 (1) ; South Dakota, Comp. Laws 1929, sec. 8903 (6), 8907; Tennessee,
Code 1932, secs. 4120, 4122, 4124; Texas, Complete Stat. 1928, art. 2031,
2031a, 2, 3 (d); Utah, Rev. Stat. 1933, sec. 18-8-1, sec. 82-1-12; Vermont,
Pub. Laws (1933) sec. 5649 (G. L. 4996) sec. 1363 (G. L. 1740) ; Virginia,
Code 1930, secs. 6064, 6066, 6070; Washington, Comp. Stat. 1922, sec. 3854;
West Virginia, Code 1931, ch. 56, sec. 14; Wisconsin, Stats. 1931, ch. 226.02
(3-7) ; Wyoming, Rev. Stats. 1931, ch. 89-814, ch. 28-108, ch. 28-113.
14Foreign Insurance Companies: Alabama, Code 1928, ses. 8352, 4612;
Arizona, Rev. Code 1928, sec. 1795; Arkansas, Stat. 1921, secs. 6048, 6063,
6091, 6133; Colorado, Stat. (Courtright's Mills Anno. 1930) sec. 3554; Dis-
trict of Columbia, Code 1929, title 5, ch. 7, sec. 172, p. 18; Connecticut,
Gen. Stat. 1930, secs. 4121, 4123, 4124, 5469; Florida, Comp. Gen. Laws
1927, secs. 6198, 6267; Georgia, Civil Code (Park's 1914) sec. 2446, 2447;
Idaho, Code 1932, ch. 40-608, 607; Illinois, Rev. Stat. (Cahill's 1933) ch.
73, see. 150, 338, 426; Indiana, Stat. Anno. (Burns 1926) sees. 9133, 9134;
Iowa, Code 1931, secs. 8766, 8767, 8768; Kansas, Rev. Stat. 1923, ch. 60-2523;
Supp. 1933, ch. 40-218; Kentucky, Stat. (Carroll's 1930) sec. 631; Louisiana,
Gen. Stat. (Dart, 1932) sec. 4018; Maine, Rev. Stat. 1930, ch. 60, sees. 118,
119; Maryland, Code Ann. 1924, art. 48A, sec. 123, sec. 28; Massachusetts,
Anno. Laws 1933, ch. 175, sec. 151; Michigan, Comp. Laws 1929, sec. 3713;
Mississippi, Code 1930, sec. 5165; Missouri, Rev. Stat. 1929, secs. 5894, 5897;
Montana, Rev. Codes 1921, sec. 6149; Nebraska, Comp. Stat. 1929, ch. 44-207,
1214, 1623; Nevada, Comp. Laws 1929, sec. 3547; New Hampshire, Pub.
Laws 1926, ch. 275, sec. 9; New Jersey, Comp. Stat., Supp. 1930, sec. 99-59;
New Mexico, Stat. 1929, ch. 71-317; New York, Consol. Laws (McKinney
1933) bk. 27, sec. 30; North Carolina, Code 1931, secs. 6411, 6414, 6415;
North Dakota, Comp. Laws, Supp. 1925, sec. 4881a16(c) ; Ohio, Gen. Code
(Throckmorton's 1930) sec. 11289; Oklahoma, Stat. 1931, sec. 10475; Ore-
gon, Code Anno. 1930, ch. 46-106; Pennsylvania, Stat. (Purdon's Perm. ed.)
title 40, sec. 48; Rhode Island, Gen. Laws 1923, sec. 3775, 3776; South
Carolina, Code 1932, sec. 7964; South Dakota, Comp. Laws 1929, sec. 9182;
Tennessee, Code 1932, sec. 6219; Texas, Stat. 1928, art. 4763, 4764; Utah,
Rev. Stat. 1933, ch. 43-5-1 (4), ch. 43-5-2; Vermont, Pub. Laws (Proposed
Revision 1933) sec. 1364 (G. L. 1741), 1365 (G. L. 1742); Virginia, Code
1930, secs. 4207, 4304 (23), (24), 3845, 3846; Washington, Comp. Stat. 1922,
sec. 7044; West Virginia, Code 1931, ch. 33, sec. 43; Wisconsin, Stat. 1931,
ch. 201, 43, 201.38, 201.385; Wyoming, Rev. Stat. 1931, sec. 89-813.
The citations to statutes occuring in this and the preceding note cover
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such statutes are not essentially different from the provisions of
statutes applying to foreign corporations generally, and they will
be discussed together, as far as possible, in this study. If any-
thing the service provisions for foreign insurance corporations
have been less generous than those applied to other foreign cor-
porations.
The service provisions of these statutes may be analyzed under
a few general groups: (1) persons or agencies of the foreign
corporation to be served with process, (2) notice and methods of
giving notice of service to the foreign corporation, (3) the scope
of actions cognizable and the parties.
AGENTS SERVED
Some statutes permit service of process on the actual agent
of the foreign corporation who may be either an officer or agency'9
of the corporation, some require the foreign corporation to ap-
point a process agent,16 and there may be a requirement that such
process agent be a resident of the state serving process."7  Other
statutes either as a matter of course or as a condition of doing
business'" within the state compel the foreign corporation to sub-
mit to service of process upon some public officer who is made a
statutory agent of the foreign corporation for this definite pur-
pose.
19
the statutory materials to be discussed in this article. Hereafter, for con-
venience, whenever it is necessary to refer to a particular statute, the refer-
ence will be by the name of the state, not by the full citation of the statute.
If there is a difference between the general service statutes and the special
statutes applying to foreign insurance companies, that will be indicated by
a division of the citations into two groups: foreign corporations, foreign
insurance companies.
15Colorado, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mary-
land (alternative), Massachusetts, Michigan (alternative), Mississippi
(alternative), Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, South
Carolina, Texas, West Virginia.
Foreign Insurance Companies: Florida, Indiana, Missouri, Ohio,
Wyoming.
16Arizona (agent in each county), California, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland (alternative), Michigan (alternative), Minne-
sota, North Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Washington, Wyoming.
In Iowa provision is made for service upon the general agent and in
Nebraska and Wyoming (alternative) upon a managing agent.
17Alabama, Maine, Nevada, New Jersey, Oregon, Rhode Island, Wis-
consin. Foreign insurance companies, Michigan (alternative), District of
Columbia, Georgia, Mississippi, Nevada, Oregon.
'
8 New York, Pennsylvania.
'
9 The secretary of state is the public officer most frequently served:
Alabama (if no agent found in state), California, Connecticut, Kansas,
SERVICE OF PROCESS
Since the foreign corporation is assumed to be doing business
within the state so as to be amenable to service of process, our
only concern in this study is whether the statutory method of
giving notice is sufficient to satisfy due process.2 On one theory
or another the courts of a state have power to entertain certain
actions against such a corporation. -1
It should make little or no difference in the validity of service
of process on either the foreign corporation or foreign insurance
corporation who is named process agent to receive service of sum-
mons. The corporation by selecting the agent and designating
him as its personal representative to receive service admits that
Louisiana, Michigan (alternative), Mississippi (alternative), New Hamp-
shire, North Dakota, New York, Vermont, South Dakota, Virginia. If no
agent is found or appointed, the secretary is served in Illinois, Iowa, Minne-
sotd, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio (as to liability already
incurred), Oklahoma, Tennessee, Washington, Wisconsin. The corporation
commissioner is served in Massachusetts and Oregon (if the foreign corpora-
tion does not maintain an agent). The auditor of state is served in Arkansas,
Nebraska, Indiana, West Virginia. In Mississippi the clerk of the court
is the officer served, and it is an alternative method in Florida.
In the case of foreign insurance companies the insurance commissioner,
superintendent, or other chief insurance officer is most frequently named
the statutory agent: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts,
Michigan (alternative), Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana. New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina. North
Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin.
The same is true in the District of Columbia if no agent is appointed. In
Indiana and Louisiana the secretary of state is served if there is no agent
of the company present in the state. Several other officers are served: com-
missioner of finance, Idaho; bank examiner, New Mexico; director of trade
and commerce, Illinois; controller, if no agent present, Nevada; corpora-
tion commission, Virginia.
2ONo real issue can be made against the process we are discussing on
the ground that it denies the equal protection of the laws. It is true that
the "equal protection of the laws" clause of the fourteenth amendment
applies to corporations, Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad
Co., (1886) 118 U. S. 394, 6 Sup. Ct. 1132, 30 L. Ed. 118, and that they
are protected against unreasonable and arbitrary discriminations thereby.
Kentucky Finance Corp. v. ParamQunt Auto Exchange Corp., (1923) 262
U. S. 544, 43 Sup. Ct. 639, 67 L. Ed. 1112; Power Mfg. Co. v. Saunders,
(1927) 274 U. S. 490, 47 Sup. Ct. 678, 71 L. Ed. 1165. However, it seems
that there is a reasonable ground for classification in the case of foreign
corporations being served with process in a state, and that a difference in
process between foreign and domestic corporations is a reasonable classifi-
cation, not denying the equal protection of the laws, seems to follow from
St. Mary's Franco-American Petroleum Co. v. West Virginia, (1906) 203
U. S. 183, 27 Sup. Ct. 132, 51 L. Ed. 144.
21There is, of course, the theory, not without support in the cases, that
no notice is necessary since the power of a state over foreign corporations
is sufficiently great to exact such a consent. This view will be criticized
later in this discussion.
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service upon the named agent will be sufficient, and the very
designation indicates that the relationship between the two is
sufficiently close that the corporation will have a reasonable proba-
bility of receiving notice of the pending action.
However, wherever statutes permit service upon any officer or
agent or "true agent" of the foreign corporation, difficulties with
a definition of "agent" arise. It is perhaps proper to say that
service upon a corporation is constructive, at least substituted, in
every case; thus it is necessary that notice be given to some repre-
sentative of the corporation. It is not likely that service upon any
employee of a foreign corporation will be sufficient. In general
the agent who is served must be possessed of such authority as
will justify the conclusion that his principal is, by him, within the
district or state ;22 he must have a truly representative character.2
Unquestionably service upon the president, 24 secretary 2 or direc-
tor 26 of a foreign corporation doing business within a state is
sufficient. Such officers are certainly representative. Likewise,
service upon the managing or general agent of a foreign corpora-
tion seems equally good because of the clear representative rela-
tionship to the foreign corporation. 7  Courts generally consider
22Chase Bag Co. v. Munson Steamship Lines, (1924) 54 App. D. C.
169, 295 Fed. 90.
23Wold v. Colt Co., (1907) 102 Minn. 386, 114 N. W. 243.
24Grant v. Cananea Consolidated Copper Co., (1907) 189 N. Y. 249,
82 N. E. 191. Vice president: Consolidated Indemnity & Ins. Co. v. Alliance
Casualty Co., (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1933) 68 F. (2d) 21.25Pomeroy v. Hocking Valley Railway Co., (1916) 218 N. Y. 530, 113
N. E. 504.
2GPennsylvania Lumbermen's Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Meyer,
(1905) 197 U. S. 407, 25 Sup. Ct. 483, 49 L. Ed. 810: St. Louis S. W. Ry.
Co. v. Alexander, (1913) 227 U. S. 218, 33 Sup. Ct. 245, 57 L. Ed. 486.
However, where a foreign corporation is not doing business within a
state, officers of the foreign corporation who go into the state do not carry
their representative capacity with them so as to render the foreign corpora-
tion amenable to suit there by service upon them. Thus service on the
president of a foreign corporation while temporarily within a state has been
held invalid. Goldey v. Morning News, (1895) 156 U. S. 518, 15 Sup. Ct.
559, 39 L. Ed. 517; Magnolia Metal Co. v. Savannah Supply Co., (N.Y.
County, Sup. Ct. Spec. Term 1915) 157 N. Y. S. 355, noted (1916) 16 Col.
L. Rev. 422. The same rule has been applied to service upon a vice-president
and a director respectively. See Puster v. Parker Mercantile Co., (1905)
70 N. J. Eq. 771, 59 Atl. 232; Riverside and Dan River Cotton Mills v.
Menefee, (1915) 237 U. S. 189, 35 Sup. Ct. 579, 59 L. Ed. 910.
27Minneapolis Threshing Machine Co. v. Ashouer, (1910) 142 Wis. 646,
126 N. W. 113; Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., (1917) 220 N. Y. 259.
115 N. E. 915; Snelling v. National Travelers Benefit Association, (1918)
102 Kan. 227, 169 Pac. 1144: Maichok v. Bertha-Consumers Co., (C.C.A.
6th Cir. 1928) 25 F. (2d) 257; Milbank v. Standard Motor Const. Co.,
(1933) 132 Cal. App. 67, 22 P. (2d) 271; Wilken v. Moorman Mfg. Co.,
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that the soliciting agents 28 and the claim adjusters 9 of foreign
corporations are likewise of a representative character. On the
other hand, service upon a mere clerk or day laborer or other
unrepresentative employee would seem to be violative of principles
of due process of law"0 since there would scarcely be any reason-
able probability that the foreign corporation would have com-
municated to it notice of a pending action given to such a person.
Service upon one who has ceased to be an agent, of course, can-
not be effective.31 Likewise, service at an agency or place of doing
business existing when a cause of action arose or at the time a
contract was executed is insufficient where neither agency nor
agent was being maintained there at the time of action." Of equal
necessity is the requirement that the agent served have interests
consistent with his agency; he must not be antagonistic. 33
(1931) 121 Neb. 1, 235 N. W. 671. See note, (1932) 8Notre Dame Lawyer
105.
In Bentley Co. v. Chivers & Sons, (D.C. N.Y., 1913) 215 Fed. 959,
there is an excellent example of the method of determining whether an agent
really has a representative capacity. Here the agent was called an "entom-
ologist" but he had plenary power to represent the defendant with respect
to important matters. He was considered to be a managing agent. See note(1914) 42 Nat. Corp. Rep. 679. See United States Merchants' & Shippers'
Ins. Co. v. Elder Dempster & Co., Ltd., (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1932) 62 F. (2d) 59.28American Asphalt Roof Corp. v. Shankland, (1928) 205 Iowa 862,
219 N. W. 28; Rishmiller v. Denver & Rio Grande Railroad Co., (1916)
134 Minn. 261, 159 N. W. 947; Kirby v. Louismann-Capen Co., (D.C. Ky.
1914) 221 Fed. 267; Connor v. Excess Insurance Co., (C.C.A. 3rd Cir. 1931)
51 F. (2d) 626. See notes (1923) 22 Mich. L. Rev. 77; (1922) 6 M.s-
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29Commercial Mutual Accident Co. v. Davis, (1909) 213 U. S. 245,
29 Sup. Ct. 445, 53 L. Ed. 782; Cheli v. Cudahy Brothers Co., (1932) 260
Mich. 496, 245 N. W. 503.
30It will be well to recall that the term due process of law has developed
into two different things; one meaning has reference to substantive right
and another refers to procedural fair play. In this article, the second mean-
ing, procedural due process, will be discussed, dealing with the question
whether the procedural devices set up in the statutes provide adequate notice
and do not place the foreign corporation at a serious disadvantage.
$'People's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., (1918) 246 U. S. 79,
38 Sup. Ct. 233, 62 L. Ed. 587; Guthrie v. Indemnity Association, (1899)
101 Tenn. 643, 49 S. W. 829; Kulver v. Middlewest Grain Co., (1919) 44
N. D. 210, 173 N. W. 468.
32Jefferson Fire Insurance Co. v. Brackin, (1913) 140 Ga. 637, 79 S. E.
467. Certainly due process could not be satisfied if there was no existing
agent or agency at the time of service.
33Tortat v. Hardin Mining and Mfg. Co., (C.C. S.D. 1901) 111 Fed. 426.
The facts of this case afford an excellent example of what should not happen.
Here the resident manager in South Dakota of an Illinois corporation, in
which he was a director, assigned a cause of action in his favor against the
corporation to a friend for purposes of bringing suit, and summons was
served upon him as manager of the corporation in the action. The court
said (p. 429) : "The interest of Hardin, who, as the real party in interest,
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A problem somewhat related to that of serving the actual agent
of the foreign corporation is that of serving a domestic, subsidiary
corporation within a state as the agent of its parent, a foreign
corporation. This corporate device has met with considerable
success and has had an extensive use. All of the stock of the sub-
sidiary may be owned by the foreign corporation, and they may
have common officers with practically nothing to distinguish the
two corporations except perhaps a separate bookkeeping device,
but the courts are reluctant to look behind the separate entity
of the subsidiary and to hold that it is a mere agent of the foreign
corporation.3 4  The Supreme Court has refused to recognize the
identity of parent and subsidiary corporation for purposes of serv-
ice of process35 despite the virtual domination of the subsidiary by
the parent and the complete stock ownership of the one by the
other. However, some state courts38 have found situations, and a
lower federal court3 T has intimated that such situations may arise,
in which they considered that the individuality of the sudsidiary
was controlled to such an extent that the parent corporation was
is plaintiff, was so antagonistic to his duty as an officer of the defendant
company to defend the suit as to render any service upon him void." The
service was quashed and set aside.
34See Cannon Manufacturing Co. v. Cudahy Co., (1925) 267 U. S. 333,
45 Sup. Ct. 250, 69 L. Ed. 634. Here the foreign corporation owned all the
stock, dominated the subsidiary completely, exerted commercial and finan-
cial control, reaped all the profits, but the two concerns kept separate books
of their transactions. The court held that the corporate separation, though
probably formal, was nevertheless real, and that service upon the subsidiary
did not bring the parent corporation into the local courts. Bachler v. May-
tag Co., (1930) 251 Mich. 439, 232 N. W. 194; Wormser, Disregard of the
Corporate Fiction and Allied Corporate Problems 54ff.
Obviously, where the foreign parent corporation has its own agents in
the state, the subsidiary cannot be served. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co. v.
Hobgood, (1932) 244 Ky. 570, 51 S. W. (2d) 920.
3 5See Peterson v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway, (1907) 205
U. S. 364, 27 Sup. Ct. 513, 51 L. Ed. 841; People's Tobacco Company Ltd.
v. American Tobacco Co., (1918) 246 U. S. 79, 38 Sup. Ct. 233, 62 L. Ed.
587; Cannon Manufacturing Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., (1925) 267 U. S.
333, 45 Sup. Ct. 250, 69 L. Ed. 634. See criticism of the court's action by
Philbrick, Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations, (1925) 20 Il. L. Rev.
281, 287. On the general problem see Ballantine, Separate Entity of Parent
and Subsidiary Corporations, (1925) 14 Cal. L. Rev. 12, 12-16, and cases
cited in notes.
36See Buie v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., (1901) 95 Tex. 51, 65 S. W.
27 overruled by Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Ben Stevens,
(1918) 109 Tex. 262, 206 S. W. 921; State of Washington v. Superior
Court, (1927) 143 Wash. 641, 255 Pac. 1030; Williams v. Freeport Sulphur
Co., (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) 40 S. W. (2d) 817, note (1932) 30 Mich. L.
Rev. 464.371ndustrial Research Corporation v. General Motors Corporation et al.,(D.C. Ohio, 1928) 29 F. (2d) 623, note (1929) 42 Harv. L. Rev. 955.
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the real actor within the state. What the Supreme Court will do
where a state has held a subsidiary to be a proper agent for serving
process upon a foreign corporation is conjectural. It is possible
that specific legislation will be necessary to clarify the situation."8
The determination of this question seems essentially a question
of degree, and if the subsidiary is a mere dummy, dominated and
controlled by a foreign corporation, there is no miscarriage of
justice in permitting an action against the foreign corporation by
serving the subsidiary domestic corporation. When the subsidiary
is dominated and controlled in every respect by the foreign cor-
poration, the situation is somewhat analogous to a foreign cor-
poration doing business within a state through a general or man-
aging agent. To permit the separate corporate entity to defeat
the interests of residents of the state in such cases is to afford
the foreign corporation a too easy opportunity actually to do
business within a state without being amenable to the liabilities
usually entailed by such activity.
NECESSITY OF NOTICE
Many state statutes provide that corporations must file a
consent2 9 to service of process upon a public officer before they
may do business within the state, others provide that service be
made upon the public officer if no actual agent is appointed 0 or
present to receive service, and others simply stipulate that service
may be made upon a designated public officer."
iBEven with specific legislation there would still remain the vexing
problem of whether the foreign corporation was actually doing business
within the state. A state might require a foreign corporation whose stock
and management control was expected to dominate the domestic corpora-
tion, as a condition for incorporating the domestic corporation, to consent
that service upon the subsidiary will be sufficient to bring the foreign cor-
poration into court. There would still be the question of the power of the
state to impose such a condition, depending upon whether the foreign cor-
poration could be said to be in any way subject to its authority. Realistically,
if the foreign corporation uses the subsidiary as a device for doing business
within a state, it must be doing business there, and as a condition to the
doing of that business through the subsidiary, the state might exact consent
to or for that matter impose liability to service upon the subsidiary cor-
poration.
89Examples: New York, Pennsylvania.
40Examples of this type are: Alabama, California, Illinois, Iowa, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, Tennessee. Some statutes, such as those in Michigan
and Mississippi, provide for an alternative method upon the agent of the
corporation or upon the public officer designated by statute.
4"Examples may be found in Indiana, Statutes (Supp. 1929) sec. 4856.33;
Massachusetts, ch. 181, sec. 3A; Washington, sec. 3854. These provisions
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Certainly, regardless of consent, service upon a public officer
who is required to make reasonable efforts to notify the foreign
corporation satisfies due process of law.42  But where there is no
provision for sending notice of the pending action, it may make a
difference whether the foreign corporation has formally consented
to service .4  Then the state authorities are able to assert that the
foreign corporation has given a true consent and is therefore un-
able to assert a violation of due process.
44
If the consent filed as a condition of doing business is bona
fide and voluntary, of course, no notice of service is required
are not very general among the states, and they usually occur in the con-
tingency when a corporation has failed to appoint an agent or has withdrawn
from a state without having left an agent for receiving service of process.
The most common type of statute requires the foreign corporation, par-
ticularly foreign insurance corporations, to file a consent to service of process
upon the public agent as a condition precedent to doing business within the
state.42A considerable number of states require notice of substituted service
of process upon the public officer to be sent to the foreign corporation:
Alabama, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, Vir-
ginia, Wisconsin.
Foreign Insurance Companies: Alabama, Arkansas, California, Con-
necticut, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin.
For a general discussion of such service, see Shirley, Foreign Corpora-
tions-Service on Statutory Agent, (1933) 11 Tex. L. Rev. 226, 227 ff.
43In those cases where service after withdrawal as to causes of action
growing out of business done within the state is authorized, the courts
say that the consent to service is implied from entering the state and
complying with the state law. But this is not true in those cases where
the corporation has ceased to do business and the cause of action arises
in another state. Chipman v. Jeffrey Co., (1920) 251 U. S. 373, 40 Sup. Ct.
172, 64 L. Ed. 314. Does not this fact expose the error of both the consent
theory and the power to exclude theory? If it is a true consent, it should
make no difference where the action arose, and if there is an absolute power to
exclude, then a condition of entrance requiring submission to all causes of
action may be imposed.
44Undoubtedly constitutional rights may be waived by free action or a
consistent course of conduct. See Pierce v. Somerset Railway, (1898) 171
U. S. 641-, 648, 19 Sup. Ct. 64, 43 L. Ed. 316; Shepard v. Barron, (1904)
194 U. S. 553, 568, 24 Sup. Ct. 737, 48 L. Ed. 1115; Pierce Oil Corp. v.
Phoenix Refining Co., (1922) 259 U. S. 125, 128, 42 Sup. Ct. 440, 66 L. Ed.
855. But it must be apparent that the authority of a state over foreign
corporations is so powerful that the conditions which they impose are in
fact compulsory, and the cases of voluntary waiver by act or conduct do not
seem particularly analogous.
Then again, is there any real necessity for such an absolute authority
over foreign corporations that they can be compelled to waive constitutional
rights as a condition of doing business within a state?
SERVICE OF PROCESS
because it has been vaived.1" But what of the statutes which
provide that the foreign corporation 41 may be served with process
by leaving it with a public officer, and which impose no duty
upon either the officer or the plaintiff to send notice of this serv-
ice ?47 Judicial authority is not conclusive upon all the problems
raised by this question. It is probable that notice of service is
essential in case the corporation is doing business in the state
without complying with, and in open violation of, the terms of
the statute, but there is reason to believe that it is not essential
in the case of the foreign corporation which has attempted to
comply with the terms of the statute by appointing process agents
or qualifying generally to do business in the state.
The reasoning of the courts which sustain service without any
provision for notice to the foreign corporation is that the foreign
corporation indicates its willingness to have notice given the pub-
lic officer by its failure to appoint a process agent. The California
supreme court declared that the corporation is in no position to
invoke the constitutional doctrine of notice since it failed to comply
with the law.48  The Oklahoma supreme court has followed the
45See Washington ex rel. Bond and Goodwin and Tucker, Inc. v.
Superior Court, (1933) 289 U. S. 361, 53 Sup. Ct. 624, 77 L Ed. 1256, in
which no notice of the service of process on the officer was given to the
foreign corporation. There were, perhaps, mitigating circumstances in
this case since service was made after the corporation had withdrawn with
outstanding liabilities, and it might be expected that judicial controversies
might arise out of them in which service was by statute authorized upon
the secretary of state.
46For an example see the West Virginia statute, constituting the
auditor of state the attorney in fact of every insurance company for the
purpose of service of process, no notice of such service being required
by the statutes. West Virginia, Code 1931, ch. 33, sec. 43.
Several other states do not require notice of service upon the public
officer to be sent to the foreign corporation. See Arizona, Kansas (securi-
ties), Texas, Washington, West Virginia (foreign insurance companies),
Arizona, District of Columbia, Florida, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York.
North Dakota, Vermont.
47Such a method of service was held lacking in due process of law
by the Supreme Court in the case of a non-resident (individual) motorist.
Wuchter v. Pizzutti, (1928) 276 U. S. 13, 48 Sup. Ct. 259, 72 L. Ed. 446.
See Culp, Process in Actions against Non-Resident Motorists, (1934) 32
Mich. L. Rev. 325, 336-338.
49Olender v. Crystalline Mining Co., (1906) 149 Cal. 482, 86 Pac
1082. The view is that the corporation is bound to know the law, and it
could have had full notice if it had appointed the required agent.
Notice to the secretary of state has been considered due process of law
In this case the theory is that the foreign corporation by entering the
state is deemed to have agreed to accept service, as to actions brought
against it, by service on the public officer. Smith v. Empire State-Idaho
Mining and Development Co., (C.C. Wash., 1904) 127 Fed. 462.
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California rule.49  But a federal district court in California re-
fused to follow the local construction of the statute because the
lack of knowledge by the corporation "shocks the conscience and
demonstrates that such attempted service constitutes a want of
compliance with the due process clause of the constitution.' ' "
Several other courts have held that service on the officer is not
due process because there is no reasonable certainty that notice
will actually reach the foreign corporation.5' And the Supreme
Court of the United States5 2 has held that a foreign corporation
which has failed to comply with the state laws and failed to ap-
point an agent for receiving service of process, though doing
business within a state, cannot be served with process upon a
public agent without some provision for sending notice of such
49Richardson Machinery Co. v. Scott, (1926) 122 Okla. 125, 251 Pac.
482, note (1927) 40 Harv. L. Rev. 906, (1927) 11 MINNESOTA LAW RE-
VIEW 559.
On account of a local rule of practice, the Supreme Court was pre-
vented from reviewing this decision. Richardson Machinery Co. v. Scott,(1928) 276 U. S. 128, 132, 48 Sup. Ct. 264, 72 L. Ed. 497. Certiorari had
been granted in (1927) 274 U. S. 729, 47 Sup. Ct. 587, 71 L. Ed. 1319.
A default judgment had been rendered in the lower court, and the law of
Oklahoma was such that the petition filed later to vacate the judgment,
based on non-jurisdictional grounds, operated as a voluntary appearance.
The question of the constitutionality of the service, the petition to vacate
having been filed afterwards, could not be raised in the Supreme Court,
though the Court had considered the constitutionality of the statute suf-
ficiently questionable to grant a writ of certiorari.
See Consolidated Flour Mills Co. v. Roberts, (1927) 123 Okla. 101,252 Pac. 29; Consolidated Flour Mills Co. v. Muegge, (1927) 127 Okla.
295, 260 Pac. 745, holding similarly.
5OKnapp v. Bullock Tractor Co., (D.C. Cal., 1917) 242 Fed. 543,
noted (1918) 27 Yale L. J. 413.
51Cella Commission Co. v. Bohlinger, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1906) 147 Fed.
419, actually the case could have been decided on the ground that there was
no doing of business in the state, but the court made much of the fact that
there was no provision in the statute for sending notice of the service upon
the public officer to the corporation; Southern Railway Co. v. Simon,(C.C. La. 1910) 184 Fed. 959, later decided in the Supreme Court on
another point, (1915) 236 U. S. 115, 35 Sup. Ct. 255, 59 L. Ed. 492; King
Tonopah Mining Co. v. Lynch, (D.C. Nev., 1916) 232 Fed. 485; Knapp v.
Bullock Tractor Co., (D.C. Cal., 1927) 242 Fed. 543.
521n Consolidated Flour Mills Co. v. Muegge, (1928) 278 U. S. 559,
49 Sup. Ct. 17, 73 L. Ed. 505, the Court, without opinion except reference to
the authority of Wuchter v. Pizzutti, (1928) 276 U. S. 13, 48 Sup. Ct. 259,
72 L. Ed. 446, reversed the Oklahoma court in a case by the same title,
reported in (1927) 127 Okla. 295, 260 Pac. 745, which had sustained service
of process under the Oklahoma Stat. 1929, sec. 5442. It seems that,
unless there has been a consent by the corporation, either in writing or by
a necessary series of acts, to a particular type of service, statutes which
fail to make any provision for sending notice to the foreign corporation
do not meet the test of due process. See note, (1933) 81 U. of Pa. L. Rev.
469.
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service to the foreign corporation. It seems clear that the method
of giving notice should be reasonably calculated to bring to the
attention of the officers or agents of the foreign corporation the
fact that the action is pending so that they may have an oppor-
tunity to make a defense."
What is the position of the foreign corporation which has com-
plied with the state laws? Is it, equally with the corporation which
has not complied with the state laws in its failure to appoint an
agent, entitled to notice of service upon a public officer? The
recent Washington case of Washington ex rel. Bond & Tucker,
Inc. v. Superior Court has a definite relation to the problem. In
this case the plaintiff corporation had qualified to do business in
the state of Washington and had appointed a statutory agent, but
it ceased to do business before this action was begun, and at the
time of suit there was no process agent within the state. Under
the circumstances the state law provided that the secretary of
state might be the service agent. This officer was served, but
the secretary made no effort to notify the foreign corporation of
the service. The supreme court of Washington considered the
service good and distinguished the case from others on the basis
that here the foreign corporation had complied with the laws of
the state and thereby consented to be bound by such laws." How-
ever, the only compliance was the appointment of an agent to re-
ceive service of process, and there was at no time any formal
consent to service of process upon the secretary of state. The
Supreme Court of the United States," on appeal, took the view
that service without notice was valid in this case." The Court
recognized the soundness of the contention that a state may not
condition entry upon the surrender of constitutional 7 rights, but
5 King Tonopah Mining Co. v. Lynch, (D.C. Nev., 1916) 232 Fed.
485. For a similar principle applied to a domestic corporation, see Pinney
v. Providence Loan and Investment Co., (1900) 106 Wis. 396, 82 N. W. 308.
"'State ex rel. Bond & Goodwin & Tucker, Inc. v. Superior Court of
Spokane County, (1932) 169 Wash. 688, 15 P. (2d) 660, noted (1933)
81 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 469. In accord, Mazzoleni v. Transamerica Corpora-
tion et al., (1933) 313 Pa. 317, 169 Ad. 127.55Washington v. Superior Court, (1933) 289 U. S. 361, 53 Sup. Ct. 624,
77 L. Ed. 1256.
5 The writer has elsewhere, (1934) 32 Mich. L. Rev. 939, stated that
"the state under its power to exclude may impose a consent to a type of
service which without the consent would be lacking in due process," relying
on this case. The statement seems to be supported by language in the case
(p. 364, 365), but the writer did not mean to state that this is the proper
position to take as to all circumstances of service upon public officers.
57(1933) 289 U. S. 361, 364-365, 53 Sup. Ct. 624, 77 L. Ed. 1256.
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it did not believe, in this respect, that the statute so offended since
it simply required the corporation to answer just claims growing
out of the business formerly done within the state. 8
It may well be that the strong fact situation was a dominating
factor in the trend of the decision. The corporation was no longer
doing business in the state; it no longer had a process agent there,
but it still had outstanding liabilities. If the Court meant to rest
its decision on the ground that in this particular case, where the
foreign corporation had failed to keep a process agent after having
maintained one, there was no denial of due process, one may agree
with the result reached. But to regard it as a precedent for the
broader position that the power of a state in all situations is suffi-
cient to impose a method of service which is fraught with possibili-
ties of harm and injustice to a foreign corporation is to give it
greater credit than is its due. As the Court59 said, a corporation,
just as an individual, by doing business in the state and qualifying
therefor assents to all reasonable conditions imposed on such corpo-
ration. It is quite true that a foreign corporation may properly be
required to accept service upon a public officer as a condition of
doing business, and possibly a corporation waives the requirement
of due process in giving notice by a genuine consent.10 But the
consent which may be implied from the appointment of a process
agent or the filing of a formal consent to service upon a public
officer can hardly be called a voluntary consent. And at most it is
questionable whether the appointment of an agent under the terms
of a statute constitutes an assent to a form of substituted process
which as to a corporation doing business in the state without having
5SThat the Court was minimizing the possibilities of harm and think-
ing of the application of its decision only to the specific situation at hand
is demonstrated by the following language: "It is true that the corpora-
tion's entry may not be conditioned upon surrender of constitutional rights,
as was attempted in the cases on which the appellant relies .... And for this
reason a state may not exact arbitrary and unreasonable terms respecting
suits against foreign corporations as the price of admission. . . . But the
statute here challenged has no such operation. It goes no farther than to
require that the corporation may be made to answer just claims asserted
against it according to law. By appointing a new agent when Shaw ceased
to be a resident of the state the appellant could have assured itself of notice
of any action. The statute informed the company that if it elected not to
appoint a successor to Shaw the secretary of state would by law become its
agent for the purpose of service." (Italics by the writer.)
59(1933) 289 U. S. 361, 364, 53 Sup. Ct. 624, 77 L. Ed. 1256. "It has
repeatedly been said that qualification of a foreign corporation in accord-
ance with the statutes permitting its entry into the state constitutes an as-
sent on its part to all the reasonable conditions imposed."
6oSee Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Co. v. Gold Issue Mining Co.,
(1917) 243 U. S. 93, 37 Sup. Ct. 344, 61 L. Ed. 610.
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appointed such an agent would not constitute due process of law."1
Everyone within the boundaries of a state is bound by all of its
laws which it may constitutionally adopt; any consent which it may
exact under its general legislative power cannot fairly be called a
voluntary consent, and therefore the terms of the consent should be
fair and equitable. A state cannot as a condition for doing business
within its territory require citizens, including corporations of an-
other state, to abandon constitutional rights since "the sovereign
power of the state in excluding foreign corporations, as in the
exercise of all others of its sovereign powers, is subject to the
limitations of the supreme fundamental law."0 12 As indicated above
this same principle applies to service of process upon a foreign
corporation doing business without appointing process agents. Why
should the corporation which has complied with the laws be less
entitled to the constitutional guaranty of due process than the for-
eign corporation which has from the first done business in defiance
of a state's legislation respecting service of process on foreign
corporations ?
The problem of notice to the foreign corporation when the
state law provides the public officer shall be the service agent
of the foreign corporation is not answered by the Washington deci-
sion discussed above. But its situation is quite analogous to either
of the two situations discussed heretofore. Such a foreign corpora-
tion is more deserving of notice than the one which violates the
state law in doing business and is equally as deserving as the for-
eign corporation defeated in the Washington case. Looking at it
from the viewpoint of what is fair and reasonable, notice of service
upon the public officer should be given to the foreign corporation.
Service laws should be no more of a trap for the corporation than
for the individual, and least of all should the foreign corporation
which in its conduct is the least law abiding be accorded the great-
est constitutional protection in the service of process.
METHODS OF GiViNG NOTICE
A variety of methods of giving notice of service upon the pub-
lic officer are prescribed by the several statutes: registered mail, 3
6'Consolidated Flour Mills Co. v. Muegge, (1928) 278 U. S. 559,
49 Sup. Ct. 17, 73 L. Ed. 505.62Terral v. Burke Construction Co., (1922) 257 U. S. 529, 42 Sup. Ct.
188, 66 L. Ed. 352.
6*Arkansas, California, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Michigan,
Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New York. Foreign insurance companies:
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
first class mail, 4 registered return65 receipted mail, telegraph,"6
publication.6 7 Most of these methods of sending notice seem to
have the necessary qualities which satisfy due process of law. There
is practically no judicial authority regarding these various types of
service in the corporation cases. However, there is sufficient au-
thority in analogous cases to make it reasonably certain that most
of these methods are satisfactory for giving notice to foreign cor-
porations. Service upon a public officer required by law to send
notice by mail to the foreign corporation or its officers is a mode of
process reasonably 68 likely to notify the defendant.05  Such service
seems fairly calculated to give actual 0 notice, and it is a method
which has probably received the approval of the Supreme Court of
the United States.7 ' For example, the non-resident automobile
statutes most frequently provide for service of notice by registered
mail.7 2 Such notice has been deemed sufficient by the courts in such
cases. 73 There should be less question about notice by registered
Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana,
Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon,
South Carolina, Texas, Utah (securities), Virginia, Washington.64Alabama (if no agent is present), Connecticut, Florida, Kansas,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Vermont, Virginia,
Wisconsin.
Foreign insurance companies: Delaware, Kansas, Kentucky, Minnesota,
Nevada, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Wisconsin.
65Registered return receipted mail: Alabama, in the case of service
upon a federally incorporated corporation without a known place of business
within the state. Foreign insurance company: Tennessee.
O6Pennsylvania (attachments against foreign insurance companies).67Florida, Georgia, Virginia (with a copy of paper carrying publication
to be sent to the post office address of defendant), West Virginia.68Town of Hinckley v. Kettle River R., (1897) 70 Minn. 105, 72 N. W.
835, cited as an example of a reasonable method of giving notice in Wuchter
v. Pizzutti, (1928) 276 U. S. 13, 23, 48 Sup. Ct. 259, 72 L. Ed. 446.69Wuchter v. Pizzutti, (1928) 276 U. S. 13, 48 Sup. Ct. 259, 72 L. Ed.
446. 70The statute seems to afford a reasonable manner of giving notice
although there is not affirmative showing that the notice mailed by the public
officer was actually received. See American Railway Express Co. v. Fleish-
mann Co., (1928) 149 Va. 200, 141 S. E. 253, error dismissed for want of a
substantial question, (1928) 278 U. S. 574, 49 Sup. Ct. 94, 73 L. Ed. 514,
on authority of Wuchter v. Pizzutti, (1928) 276 U. S. 13, 48 Sup. Ct. 259,
73 L. Ed. 446, in which the rule that the mode of service must afford a
reasonable probability that notice of service will be communicated to the
defendant was announced.
71(1928) 278 U. S. 574, 49 Sup. Ct. 94, 73 L. Ed. 514.
72See Culp, Process in Actions against Non-Resident Motorists, (1934)
32 Mich. L. Rev. 325, 338.73See Dwyer v. Volmar, (1929) 105 N. J. L. 518, 156 Ati. 685; Cohen
v. Plutschak, (D.C. N.J. 1930) 40 F. (2d) 727. Such notice certainly
satisfies the test set up in Wuchter v. Pizzutti, (1928) 276 U. S. 13, 20, 48
Sup. Ct. 259, 261, 72 L. Ed. 446.
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mail where a return receipt must be signed and returned by the
defendant and filed with the papers in the case before the action
may proceed and judgment be obtained.7 4 Though less certain than
the above mentioned methods, notice sent by ordinary mail to the
actual address of the non-resident motorist has been held, with
good reason, to satisfy due process of law.7 5 It should be equally
satisfactory for sending notice to foreign corporations.-0 The tele-
graph7 7 has been used very little for giving notice, but it seems,
equally with first class mail, to afford a reasonable probability that
the foreign corporation will be informed of the service and pending
action. One state has, in a limited way, provided for personal serv-
ice upon the foreign corporation outside the state." This method
should be even better than service upon a public officer who sends
notice by mall of such service.9
There is considerable question whether service and notice by
publication in personal actions against foreign corporations is con-
sistent with the requirements of due process of law. Service by
publication cannot give rise to a valid judgment against a non-
resident individual who has neither been personally served within
the state nor voluntarily entered an appearance.8 0 The foreign cor-
poration should be equally protected with the individual against
default judgments rendered after service by publication unless the
doctrine of consent which is implied from the corporation's enter-
ing and complying with the laws of a state gives license to author-
ize service and notice by such a method."' It seems that other
74See Poti v. New England Road Machinery Co., (1928) 83 N. H. 232,
140 Atl. 587; Moore v. Payne, (D.C. La. 1929) 35 F. (2d) 232.
75See State ex rel. Cronkhite v. Belden, (1927) 193 Wis. 145, 211 N. W.
916; Schilling v. Odelbak, (1929) 177 Minn. 90, 224 N. W. 694.7 0Note that in American Railway Express Co. v. Fleishmann, Morris &
Co., (1928) 149 Va. 200, 141 S. E. 253, this method of service was authorized
bystatute, though not passed upon by the court.77See note 66, supra. In the case of an attachment served upon the
Pennsylvania Insurance Commissioner, it is his duty to give immediate
notice of this fact by telegraph.78New Jersey, Comp. Stat. 1930 supp., sec. 186-10a (12), with referencc
to the securities law when the foreign corporation cannot be served within
the state.
79Personal service on a corporate defendant outside the state has been
upheld. See Stevens, Attorney General v. Television, Inc., (1933) 111
N. J. Eq. 306, 162 AtI. 248, noted, (1933) 18 Corn. L. Q. 435.
8oPennoyer v. Neff, (1878) 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. Ed. 565; McDonald v.
Mabee, (1917) 243 U. S. 90, 37 Sup. Ct. 343, 61 L. Ed. 608.
81See Washington ex rel. Bond, etc. v. Superior Court, (1933) 289
U. S. 361, 53 Sup. Ct. 624, 77 L. Ed. 1256, discussed supra. The situation
in this case was not very unreasonable, but it may be questionable whether
the Supreme Court would hold that the qualification of a foreign corporation
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reasonable methods of giving notice are easily available in case
the foreign corporation cannot be served within the state, 2 and that
service by publication is both unreasonable and unnecessary and
is inconsistent with our sense of fair play.
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LIMITS OF LIABILITY TO SERVICE
A problem of some importance is how long a foreign corpora-
tion which has been doing business within a state and has with-
drawn and ceased to do business may be liable to suit in the courts
of that state by service of process upon its agent or a public officer
designated by statute. A good many states provide by statute that
the liability to such service shall continue so long as any liability
or obligation incurred while doing business in the state is outstand-
ing. Here again statutes vary, some requiring that the foreign cor-
poration consent to service of process upon its agent or a public
official so long as there shall be any liability growing out of the
business outstanding, while others make direct provisions for lia-
bility to such service to continue so long as obligations growing out
of the business remain unsatisfied.
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in accordance with the statutes permitting its entry into the state constitutes
ais assent on its part to service by publication. It all depends upon whether
such a provision is reasonable.
For service by publication on a domestic corporation, see A. S. White &
Co. v. Jordan, (1919) 124 Va. 465, 98 S. E. 24.82 1t is possible that a statute such as that in Virginia (Virginia, Code
1930, sec. 6064, 6070), providing for publication and the sending of a copy
of such publication to the address of the defendant, if the address is accurate
and certain to be the actual address, provides sufficient notice. But then
there still remains the question whether there must be an actual or statutory
agent in the state upon whom the court process must be served.
83A point closely related to the fairness of notice given to foreign
corporations is that of continuances permitted before trial. Very few of
the statutes have special provision for continuances. See Wyoming. Unless
the general statutes relating to continuances apply to these actions against
foreign corporations, there is considerable doubt whether this procedure
affords due process and the equal protection of the laws unless the power
over foreign corporations is so great that they can be compelled to forego
these rights too. Where there are agents of the foreign corporation in the
state and the corporation is doing business there, it presumably has an
adequate opportunity to prepare a defense under the general statutes, but
this would not reasonably be the case where the foreign corporation has
withdrawn from the state and is sued as to some transaction occurring while
it was doing business therein by service upon a public officer who owes no
duty to send it any notice of the pending action.
Similar objections would apply to statutes which prescribe a limited
time, possibly very short, within which the foreign corporation must file
its answer in an action after service has been made upon a public officer.
For such a limiting statute see California, Statutes 1933, sec. 406a.
s4See California, North Dakota, New York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, Wisconsin. Foreign insurance coin-
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The fact that formal consent is given in some cases does not
seem important; if the power is present in the first case to require
a consent, it is likewise present to impose, without consent, the
liability. Although some courts base the power upon consent im-
plied from doing business within the state"5 and others upon a con-
sideration moving from the corporation in return for the privilege
of doing business, it seems preferable to base the power upon the
general legislative authority of a state to protect its citizens and
residents against foreign corporations."8 Such a view has to look
neither for consent nor for a consideration to sustain service; it is
simply one of the various laws to which a foreign corporation is
subjected when it enfers the state.
The state may undoubtedly require the foreign corporation to
designate a statutory service agent whose power to accept service
of process shall be irrevocable as long as any liability remains out-
standing and arising out of the business done within the state,"t
and impose liability, without consent, as to similar just claims. 8
On the other hand, a service agent will have no continuing power
after withdrawal unless it appears from the statute that it was the
legislative intent to continue liability after ceasing to do business.85
Nor is it possible to make the liability to service of process within
the state irrevocable, beyond the time in which outstanding liabili-
ties growing out of the business done within the state have ceased
panies, see Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Missouri, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin.
85Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Spratley, (1899) 172 U. S.
602, 19 Sup. Ct. 308, 43 L. Ed. 569.
8 fBrown-Ketcham Iron Works v. The George B. Swift Co., (1913)
53 Ind. App. 630, 651; American Loan & Investment Co. v. Borass, (1923)
156 Minn. 431, 434, 195 N. W. 271. In neither case was this the sole basis
of enforcing power to authorize service, but it seemed to play a prominent
part in the decision.
8t Collier v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, (C.C. Ark., 1902) 119
Fed. 617; Woodward v. Mutual Reserve Life Insurance Co., (1904) 178
N. Y. 485, 71 N. E. 10; Braunstein v. Fraternal Union of America, (1916)
133 Minn. 8, 157 N. W. 721; Kraus v. American Tobacco Co., (1925) 283
Pa. St. 146, 129 Atl. 60. See Shirley, Foreign Corporations-Service on
Statutory Agents, (1933) 11 Tex. L. Rev. 226. See Wait v. Morrison,
(1929) 129 Kan. 53, 281 Pac. 906, for a case construing such a statute to
cover causes of action arising prior to the filing of the formal consent.
88Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Spratley, (1899) 172 U. S.
602, 19 Sup. Ct. 308, 43 L Ed. 569. American Loan and Investment Co.
v. Borass, (1923) 156 Minn. 431, 195 N. W. 271.
89Forrest v. Pittsburgh Bridge Co., (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1902) 116 Fed.
357. See Mutual Reserve Fund Life Association v. Boyer, (1900) 62 Kan.
31, 40-41, 61 Pac. 387.
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to exist.9 0 If the statute bears this construction, the power to re-
ceive service of process ceases with the discontinuance of doing
business within the state.
There has been some question how far the foreign corporation
may be made amenable to service upon a statutory agent after with-
drawal from business within a state as to all transitory causes of
action growing out of transactions occurring anywhere during the
time the corporation was doing business within the state. It seems
clear that all actions arising out of obligations incurred within the
state out of the business transacted are properly begun by such
service."'
We have no clear cases deciding upon the power of a state to
authorize service as to causes of action unconnected with the busi-
ness transacted within a state. The Supreme Court 92 has said that
a clause in a statute continuing the authority of the statutory agent
"in force and irrevocable so long as any liability of said company
remains outstanding in said state" did not apply to causes of action
unconnected with the business done within the state, but it may be
doubted whether the statute under consideration was intended to
cover such causes of action. 3 In two other cases9 4 the Supreme
9°Friedman v. Empire Life Insurance Co., (C.C. Ky., 1899) 101 Fed.
535; Swann v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Association, (C.C. Ky., (1900)
100 Fed. 922. See Home Benefit Society of New York v. Muehl, (1900)
109 Ky. 479, 59 S. W. 520.
91Life Insurance Co. v. Spratley, (1897) 90 Tenn. 322, 42 S. W. 145;
Fisher v. Insurance Co., (1904) 136 N. C. 217, 48 S. E. 667; Groel v.
United Electric Co., (1905) 69 N. J. Eq. 397, 60 Atl. 822; Brown Ketcham
Iron Works v. George B. Swift Co., (1913) 53 Ind. App. 630; Title
Guaranty & Surety Co. v. Slinker, (1914) 42 Okla. 811, 143 Pac. 41; Kaw
Boiler Works v. Frymer, (1924) 100 Okla. 81, 227 Pac. 453; American
Loan & Investment Co. v. Borass, (1923) 156 Minn. 431, 195 N. W. 271;
Sydeman Bros., Inc. v. Wofford, (1932) 185 Ark. 775, 49 S. W. (2d) 363;
State v. Superior Court, (1932) 169 Wash. 688, 15 P. (2d) 660, noted
(1933) 19 Va. L. Rev. 514; McCord Lumber Co. v. Doyle, (C.C.A. 8th Cir.
1899) 97 Fed. 22; Hill et al. v. Empire State-Idaho Mining & Development
Co., (C.C. Idaho 1907) 156 Fed. 797; Zendle v. Garfield Aniline Works,
Inc., (D.C. N.J. 1928) 29 F. (2d) 415; Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance
Co. v. Spratley, (1899) 172 U. S. 602, 19 Sup. Ct. 308, 43 L. Ed. 569;
Mutual Reserve Fund Life Association v. Phelps, (1903) 190 U. S. 147, 23
Sup. Ct. 707, 47 L. Ed. 987; Washington v. Superior Court, (1933) 289
U. S. 361, 53 Sup. Ct. 624, 77 L. Ed. 1256. But the statute must definitely
apply. See Cowikee Mills v. Gorgia-Alabama Power Co., (1927) 216 Ala.
221, 113 So. 4.92Hunter v. Mutual Reserve Life Insurance Co., (1910) 218 U. S. 573.
31 Sup. Ct. 127, 54 L. Ed. 1155.93Hunter v. Mutual Reserve Life Insurance Co., (1910) 218 U. S. 573.
591, 31 Sup. Ct. 127, 54 L. Ed. 1155.9 4Chipman v. Jeffery Co., (1920) 251 U. S. 373, 40 Sup. Ct. 172, 64 L.
Ed. 314, below, (D.C. N.Y. 1919) 260 Fed. 856, noted (1920) 33 Harv. L.
Rev. 730, (1920) 20 Col. L. Rev. 618; Mitchell Furniture Co. v. Selden
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Court has refused to sanction service of process as to causes of
action not arising out of the business transacted within the state,
but here too there was a clear indication that the statutes purport-
ing to authorize such service were not so construed. The Court did
state that "the purpose in requiring the appointment of such an
agent is primarily to secure local jurisdiction in respect of business
transacted within the state." 95 And this should, perhaps, be the
key9" to the test of whether all transitory causes of action are cog-
nizable under such a statutory authorization. The reason for such a
provision is to protect the residents of the state against a foreign
corporation, and this seems reasonable. 7 On the other hand, it
seems unreasonable and unfair to permit suits on all transitory
causes of action to be commenced by such service within a state
after a foreign corporation has ceased to do business therein.9
Breck Construction Co., (1921) 257 U. S. 213, 42 Sup. Ct. 84, 66 L. Ed. 201.95 Mfitchell Furniture Co. v. Selden Breck Co., (1921) U. S. 213,
215, 42 Sup. Ct. 84, 66 L. Ed. 201.
96The Court expressed doubts as to the reason for permitting service in
all transitory causes of action, and refused so to construe the state law
unless it so provided either expressly or had been so interpreted in the local
courts. (1921) 257 U. S. 213, 215-216, 42 Sup. Ct. 84, 66 L. Ed. 201: "Of
course when a foreign corporation appoints one as required by statute it
takes the risk of the construction that will be put upon the statute and the
scope of the agency by the state court. . . . But the reasons for a limited
interpretation of a compulsory assent arc hardly less strong when the assent
is expressed by the appointment of an agent than wzhen it is implied from
going into business in the state without appointing one. In the latter case
the implication is limited to business transacted within the state. . . .
Unless the state law either expressly or by local construction gives to the
appointment a larger scope, we should not construe it to extend to suits
in respect of business transacted by the foreign corporation elsewhere, at
least if begun as this was, when the long previous appointment of the agent
is the only ground for imputing to the defendant an even technical presence."
(Italics by the writer.)
97Just as in the case of the non-resident individual doing business in a
state the balance of convenience shifts sharply in favor of the resident plain-
tiff and against the non-resident defendant when all transitory actions are
permitted, so in the case of the foreign corporation the inclusion of all
transitory actions, regardless of origin, seems to go beyond the results
which reason and public policy favor. In both cases the purpose is to provide
a convenient method of protecting the rights of the residents of a state.
obviating the necessity of their going to the defendant's residence or place
of business to secure legal redress for transactions occurring within their
home state. See Culp, Process in Actions against Non-Residents Doing
Business within a State, (1934) 32 Mich. L. Rev. 909, 941.
98In the case of foreign corporations, where there has been no formal
consent to service of process nor any attempt to comply with the statutes
respecting service of process, the power of a state is limited to serving a
public officer when the cause of action arises out of the business or acts
committed wvithin the serving state. Old Wayne Life Association v. Mc-
Donough, (1907) 204 U. S. 8, 27 Sup. Ct. 236, 51 L. Ed. 345; Simon v.
Southern Railway Co., (1915) 236 U. S. 115, 130-132, 35 Sup. Ct. 255,
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LIMITS TO CAUSES OF ACTION
Important problems arise relative to the scope of actions main-
tainable against a foreign corporation while it is doing business
within a state. Questions concerning the interpretation of the con-
sent to service filed by the foreign corporation as well as the scope
of actions where the foreign corporation has neither consented nor
complied with the laws are involved. The foreign corporation takes
the risk of any rational interpretation which may be put upon its
actual consent by the courts 09 Thus an appointment of a public
officer in terms broad enough to include service in causes of action
arising in other states received that construction by the Court, and
the position was maintained.100 In the cases where the foreign
corporation is doing business without complying with the laws of
the state, service of process upon a public agent will by implica-
tion be extended only to causes of action arising out of the business
transacted within the State.1"' It seems that in such cases service
261, 59 L. Ed. 492.
Are there any stronger reasons or urgent public policy why a foreign
corporation which has complied with the state law, but ceased to do business
in the state, should be held to a wider responsibility after its retirement than
the foreign corporation which has either by design or accident failed to
comply with the law at all?
9 9Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Co. v. Gold Issue Mining and Milling
Co., (1917) 243 U. S. 93, 96, 95, 37 Sup. Ct. 344, 61 L. Ed. 610: "But when
a power actually is conferred by a document, the party executing it takes the
risk of the interpretation that may be put upon it by the courts. The
execution was defendant's voluntary act."
"It appointed an agent in language that rationally might go that length.
The language has been held to go that length, and the construction does not
deprive the defendant of due process of law even if it took the defendant by
surprise, which we have no warrant to assume."
100(1917) 243 U. S. 93, 37 Sup. Ct. 344, 61 L. Ed. 610. Here the Fire
Insurance Company obtained a license to do business in Missouri and filed
with the superintendent of insurance a consent to service on that officer so
long as it should have outstanding liabilities in the state. It was held that
the consent covered service in an action in Missouri on a policy issued in
Colorado on buildings located there.
110Old Wayne Life Association v. McDonough, (1907) 204 U. S. 8. 27
Sup. Ct. 236, 51 L. Ed. 345. In this case a Pennsylvania statute required
insurance companies doing business within the state to appoint a process
agent or agree that service would be made on the insurance commissioner.
The commissioner was served in an action in Pennsylvania brought upon a
life insurance policy issued in Indiana. The company did some business in
Pennsylvania, but nothing relative to the particular policy was done in the
state. The statute provided that in default of an appointment of an agent
to receive service, it should be made on the insurance commissioner or on
someone deputized by him to receive it. The Supreme Court held that the
Pennsylvania judgment was not entitled to full faith and credit in Indiana.
The following passage from the opinion of the court is instructive (p.
21): "Undoubtedly, it was competent for Pennsylvania to declare that no
insurance corporation should transact business within its limits without
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upon the public officer is simply an instrument of justice, and
policy does not favor authorizing service except as to causes of
action arising from the business transacted by the foreign cor-
poration in the state.1
0 2
Most of the statutes make no direct reference to the causes
of action which may be brought by means of such service, some
few providing that they may be brought regardless of origin, 103
others restricting their scope somewhat. 10 The preponderance of
judicial authority is favorable to the view that all transitory causes
of action may be prosecuted against a foreign corporation which
filing the written stipulation specified in its statutes .... It is equally true
that if an insurance company of another state transacts business in Penn-
sylvania without complying it will be deemed to have assented to any valid
terms prescribed for doing business there... Such assent cannot properly
be implied where it affirmatively appears that business was not transacted
in Pennsylvania. . . . While the highest considerations of public policy
demand that an insurance corporation, entering a state in defiance of a
statute which lawfully prescribes the terms upon which it may exert its
powers there, should be held to have assented to such terms as to business
there transacted by it, it would be going very far to imply, and we do
not imply, such assent as to business transacted in another state, although
citizens of the former state may be interested in such business." See Morris
& Co. v. Skandinavia Ins. Co., (1929) 279 U. S. 405, 49 Sup. Ct. 360, 73
L. Ed. 762; Powell v. Home Seekers' Realty Co., (1928) 131 Misc. Rep.
590, 228 N. Y. S. 131.
1
0 2Simon v. Southern Railway Co., (1915) 236 U. S. 114, 130, 35 Sup.
Ct. 255, 59 L. Ed. 492:
"Subject to exceptions, not material here, every state has the undoubted
right to provide for service of process upon any foreign corporation doing
business therein; to require such company to name agents upon whom
service may be made; and also to provide that in case of the company's
failure to appoint such agents, service, in proper cases, may be made upon
an officer designated by la. ... But this power to designate by statute the
officer upon whom service in suits against foreign corporations may be made
relates to business and transactions within the jurisdiction of the state
enacting the law. Otherwise, claims on contracts wherever made and
suits for torts, wherever committed might by virtue of such compulsory
statute be drawn to the jurisdiction of any state in which the foreign cor-
poration might at any time be carrying on business. The manifest in-
convenience and hardship arising from such extra-territorial extension of
jurisdiction, by virtue of the power to make such compulsory appointments
could not defeat the power if in law it could be rightfully exerted. But
these possible inconveniences serve to emphasize the importance of the
principle.., that the statutory consent of a foreign corporation to be sued
does not extend to causes of action arising in other states." See Harnisch-
feger Sale Corp. v. Sternberg Co., Inc., (1934) 179 La. 317, 154 So. 10, 12.
'
0 3Arkansas, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Insurance: California, Florida,
Georgia.
10 4California, North Dakota, New York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, Wisconsin. Insurance: Arkansas;
so long as any liability remains outstanding against the company: Colorado,
Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas,
Utah, Wisconsin.
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has been served by its voluntary agent within the state. 0 5 The
burden of the authority opposing this position is that the corpora-
tion which is served by its voluntary agent is as much protected
as the corporation which is served by means of a statutory agent,
and that the basis of the power is the same in both cases.'00 There
is much to be said for this view because the consent implied from
authorizing agents to do business within the state is based upon
the reasonable legislative power and probably should not be
construed as would a voluntary consent.10 7 The Supreme Court
'
05 Mooney et al v. Buford & George Manufacturing Co., (C.C.A. 7th
Cir. 1896) 72 Fed. 32; Smolik v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal and Iron
Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1915) 222 Fed. 148; Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Weeks
et al., (D.C. Tex. 1918) 248 Fed. 970; Philadelphia & Reading Coal and
Iron Co. v. Kever, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1919) 260 Fed. 534; Rishmiller v. Denver
& Rio Grande Railroad Co., (1916) 134 Minn. 261, 159 N. W. 272; Reynolds
v. Missouri, Kansas and Texas Railway Co., (1917) 228 Mass. 584, 117
N. E. 913; Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., (1917) 220 N. Y. 259, 115
N. E. 915; Steele v. Western Union Telegraph Co., (1934) 206 N. C. 220,
173 S. E. 583. See Osborne, Arising out of Business Done in the State,
(1923) 7 MINNESOrA LAW REvIEw 380.
106Fry v. Denver & R. Ry. Co., (D.C. Cal. 1915) 226 Fed. 893, 895:
"While, as indicated [Old Wayne Life Ass'n v. McDonough, (1907) 204
U. S. 8, 27 Sup. Ct. 236, 51 L. Ed. 345], service in that case was had upon
a designated official of the state, and not an agent of the corporation, the
language employed by the court is, as suggested by counsel for the de-
fendant, obviously as applicable to the latter case as to the former, since
manifestly, under the principles announced by the court, the basis of all
process on a foreign corporation is its actual or implied assent, by entering
the state and doing business there, to its being served in accordance with the
statute of the state, whether such service be had on an officer of the
state or an agent of the corporation. In either case, such assent without the
voluntary appearance of the defendant may only be implied as to process
in actions founded on contracts originating within the state of service....
"The effect of these principles is that it is not enough in such a case
that the foreign corporation be doing business in the state where sued, but
it must appear that the cause of action arose from the business done. This
requisite is thus made a fact essential to confer jurisdiction of the defendant;
and manifestly what must be proved in the way of substantive fact must be
alleged." See Takacs v. Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co., (D.C. N.Y., 1915) 228
Fed. 728, in accord.
107Although it may be inconvenient to a foreign corporation to defend
all transitory dauses of action in every state in which it is doing business,
there is a necessary amount of inconvenience in defending suits, on transi-
tory causes of action, brought against both individuals and corporations
away from their residence or principal place of business. And as already
pointed out, it has never been considered unfair and a denial of due process
to sue an individual defendant wherever he may be served personally in
transitory causes of action.
Perhaps, in view of the possibility of vexatious and very inconvenient
suits against such foreign corporations, a discretionary, general application
of the doctrine of forum non conveniens might provide a very satisfactory
solution for the problem. See Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens
in Anglo-American Law, (1929) 29 Col. L. Rev. 1; (1924) 24 Col. L. Rev.
920; (1928) 37 Yale L. J. 983; (1930) 15 MINNESOTA LAw REViEw 83;
(1932) 30 Mich. L. Rev. 610. Hansell, The Proper Forum for Suits
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in a fairly recent decision held that it is not a violation of due
process of law not to extend process to transitory causes of action
arising outside of the state, 08 but it has never decided whether
it is a violation of due process to authorize such service upon the
voluntary agents of the foreign corporation doing business within
the state.1 9
The problem of serving a foreign corporation doing business
within a state with process in transitory causes of action arising
outside the state is not easily settled on principle. It is probably
true that some inconvenience will result to a foreign corporation
in having to defend causes of action from outside the state in
which it is doing business. But an individual is subject to suit
at his residence and wherever he may be personally served with
process in all transitory causes of action. It may be highly in-
convenient for him to defend actions in other states than that of
his residence, but there has never been any objection on this basis
alone, although there may be exceptions, as a matter of policy,
where the non-resident is induced to enter the state by trick or
fraud. Likewise, on principle, there is nothing inherently violative
of our sense of right and justice in serving a foreign corporation
doing business within a state in all transitory causes of action.
If the state statute requires the corporation doing business
therein to appoint a special process agent- 0 as a condition of doing
business, and the corporation does make the appointment, it would
seem that the scope of actions servable upon such agent should,
like the formal consent to service upon a public officer, be de-
Against Foreign Corporations, (1927) 27 Col. L. Rev. 12. For an example
of a refusal to interfere in internal management of a foreign corporation,
see Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., (1933) 288 U. S. 123, 53 Sup. Ct. 295,
77 L. Ed. 652; Wright v. Post, (1929) 268 Mass. 126, 167 N. E. 278;
Beasley et al. v. Mutual Housing Co., (1930) 59 App. D. C. 245, 39 F.(2d) 290.08Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Clarendon Boat Oar Co., Inc.,(1922) 257 U. S. 533, 42 Sup. Ct. 210, 66 L. Ed. 354.09When the action is transitory and arising outside of the state, a
statute may provide for a different type of agent to be served. It may
provide that an agent of a higher representative character be served than
in the case of causes of action arising within the state. See American
Indemnity Co. v. Detroit Fidelity and Surety Co. et al., (C.C.A. Sth Cir.
1933) 63 F. (2d) 395, 397, construing the Texas statute. See also Atchison,
T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Weeks et al., (D.C. Tex., 1918) 248 Fed. 970.liOThis is the case in several states. See Alabama, Arizona, California,
Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Maine, Michigan,
Minnesota, North Carolina, Nevada, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee,
Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, Wyoming. Insurance Companies: District
of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Michigan (alternative), Mississippi(alternative), Nevada, Oregon.
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termined by the reasonable and rational construction of the statute
authorizing such service,"' and similarly, if a construction is given
which extends to all transitory causes of action regardless of their
origin, service in all such actions upon the specially appointed
process agent should be valid.' 2
PARTIES
Ordinarily anyone may bring an action against a foreign cor-
poration doing business within a state; it makes little difference
whether the plaintiff is a resident of the state or not. It seems
probably true, as in the case of the non-resident motorist"' and
the non-resident individuals doing business within a state, that
the service statutes are designed primarily for the benefit of the
residents of the state in which the foreign corporation is doing
business," 4 but not exclusively so, and the courts are deemed to
"'Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Co. v. Gold Issue Mining and Milling
Co., (1917) 243 U. S. 93, 95, 37 Sup. Ct. 344, 61 L. Ed. 610. See Massa-
chusetts Bonding & Insurance Co. v. Concrete Steel Bridge Co., (C.C.A.
4th Cir. 1930) 37 F. (2d) 695.
"12In Bagdon v. Philadelphia and Reading Coal and Iron Co., (1916)
217 N. Y. 432, 436, 111 N. E. 1075, Judge Cardozo, distinguishing the cases
in which no agent had been designated, said that a corporation which has
designated an agent may be served with process without limit as to subject-
matter. "The stipulation is, therefore, a true contract. The person
designated is a true agent, the consent that he shall represent the corpora-
tion is a real consent. He is made the person 'upon whom process against
the corporation may be served.' The actions in which he is to represent
the corporation are not limited. The meaning must, therefore, be that the
appointment is for any actions which under the laws of this state may be
brought against a foreign corporation. The contract deals with jurisdiction
of the person. It does not enlarge or diminish jurisdiction of the subject-
matter. It means that whenever jurisdiction of the subject matter is present,
service on the agent shall give jurisdiction of the person." . . .
(P. 438): "The statute makes no provision for service on a public
officer if a designation is not filed; the corporation may withhold and carry
on business legally; all that it forfeits is the right to enforce its contracts
in our courts. In return for that privilege, it has made a voluntary ap-
pointment of an agent selected by itself. We are not imposing or implying
a legal duty. We are construing a contract .. "
It will be noted that this statute being construed is different from most
of the state statutes providing for service on process agent, but the reason-
ing of the court in the first quotation should apply to them as well.
"13See Culp, Process in Actions against Non-Resident Motorists, (1934)
32 Mich. L. Rev. 325, 347-348; Culp, Process in Actions against Non-Resi-
dents Doing Business within a State, (1934) 32 Mich. L. Rev. 909, 921-922.
114 Johnston v. Trade Insurance Co., (1882) 132 Mass. 432, 435; "It is
also true that the main purpose of the statute is to secure to our own citizens
the benefit of our laws and tribunals in regard to contracts made by foreign
insurance companies who do business in this state, and it contains particular
provisions which clearly indicate this general purpose. But it is true of
all our statutes, applicable to our own citizens, that their primary object
SERVICE OF PROCESS
be open to non-residents equally with residents. 1 5 It is possible
that some states may restrict the parties plaintiff by statute,"'
but if there is no such restriction, it seems that any party plaintiff,
regardless of his residence, may have process served on such
foreign corporation.
GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS
There is a question, which the Supreme Court has never con-
sidered, whether the statutes discussed in this article apply to
corporations chartered by or incorporated by the federal govern-
ment.117 Some courts take the position that the statutes apply only
to those foreign corporations doing business within the state by
the comity of the state, and, since the state has no power to
is the benefit of our own citizens, and the security and protection of their
rights. We have, however, always extended the privileges of our laws to
non-residents, and opened our courts to their litigation, if the defendant
can be found here.. !.
The court reasoned that the plaintiff could have sued a non-resident
individual temporarily within the state, and it held it could not deny him a
like privilege against a foreign corporation doing business in the state. See
State ex rel. Ferrocarriles Nacionagles De Mexico v. Rutledge, (1932)
331 Mo. 1015, 56 S. W. (2d) 28, 33.
See discussion in State ex rel. Watkins v. Land and Timber Co., (1902)
106 La. 621, 630, 31 So. 172. Note, (1929) 38 Yale L, J. 1148.
'15 A refusal to entertain the action of a non-resident plaintiff would
discriminate against this class of persons, and might raise a question whether
the discrimination was forbidden by the privileges and immunities clause of
article IV. Article IV, however, does not prevent reasonable discrimina-
tions. See Canadian Northern Railway v. Eggen, (1920) 252 U. S. 553,
560, 40 Sup. Ct. 402, 404, 64 L. Ed. 713.
11 6See South Carolina, Code 1932, sec. 826. providing that any action
against a foreign corporation might be brought by any resident of tile state
for any cause of action, and by a plaintiff not a resident of the state, when
the cause of action arises out of business in the state or the subject of the
action is situated within the state. Also see New York, Corporation Law.
sec. 224, 225, and Rzeszotarski v. Cooperative Ass'n Kasa Polska, (1931)
139 Misc. Rep. 400, 247 N. Y. S. 471, construing it.
It is possible that such a statute does not unreasonably discriminate
against non-residents in the constitutional sense; it provides for the needs
of all classes which really need the facilities of the local courts, and seems to
make a reasonable classification.
117It is admittedly a question of statutory construction, trying to ascer-
tain the legislative intent. In most cases it is doubtful whether the legisla-
tures had such federally incorporated corporations in mind. Then it becomes
a question of policy whether such statutes are to be applied to such corpora-
tions in the absence of congressional legislation.
If Congress exempts such corporations from the operation of these
statutes, a distinct and new problem is presented. Under the doctrine of
mutual freedom from interference by each government which exists under
our dual sovereignty coupled with the paramount action of Congress within
its own sphere, freedom from suit might be developed. But in the absence
of such statutory exemption or a specific subjection, the question is open.
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exclude the federal corporation, the provisions of the statutes do
not apply to it.11 Such decisions proceed upon the assumption
that the only basis for control over foreign corporations is the
power to exclude them. But other courts have not found it
necessary to say that whatever the state cannot exclude it is unable
to regulate. 119 The reasons for service over many of the federal
corporations are as compelling as those for service on foreign
118 See Van Dorn, Government Owned Corporations, 289-294; Sloan
Shipyards Corp. et al. v. U. S. Fleet Corp., (1922) 258 U. S. 549, 566 ff.,
42 Sup. Ct. 386, 66 L. Ed. 762; Leggett v. Federal Land Bank of Columbia,
(1933) 204 N. C. 151, 153, 167. S. E. 557, noted, (1933) 42 Yale L. J. 1287:
"The defendant in the instant case is a corporation created and organized
under an act of the Congress of the United States, known as 'The Federal
Farm Loan Act.' The validity of this act was upheld. . . . The defendant
was not only created and organized under and by virtue of such act of
Congress; it derives its right to own property and to do business in this
state, solely from said act. It is not a foreign corporation, having property
or doing business in this state, under a license, express or implied, from
North Carolina. . . . For this reason the provisions of C. S. 1137, are not
applicable to the defendant."
It will be noted that the language of the statute, "Every corporation
having property or doing business in this State, whether incorporated under
its laws or not," is broad enough to include such federal corporations. Many
other statutes are phrased in similar language.
'
t 9 Presence of the corporation has been considered sufficient to authorize
service of process in other cases. See Barrow Steamship Co. v. Kane,
(1898) 170 U. S. 100, 106, 18 Sup. Ct. 526, 42 L. Ed. 964; International
Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, (1914) 234 U. S. 579, 588, 34 Sup. Ct. 853, 58
L. Ed. 1284; Davis v. Farmers Co-operative Equity Co., (1923) 262 U. S.
312, 316. 43 Sup. Ct. 556, 67 L. Ed. 996; Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co.,
(1915) 22-0 N. Y. 259, 268 ff., 115 N. E. 915. The same view has been
expressed in a somewhat analogous situation. State ex rel. Cronkhite v.
Belden, (1927) 193 Wis. 145, 153 ff., 211 N. W. 916.
Language applied by the Supreme Court to corporations engaged in
interstate commerce might well be applied to federally chartered or in-
corporated private corporations. In International Harvester Co. v. Ken-
tucky, (1914) 234 U. S. 479, 588, 34 Sup. Ct. 853, 58 L. Ed. 1284, Mr.
Justice Day wrote: "True, it has been held time and again that a state
cannot burden interstate commerce or pass laws which amount to the
regulation of such commerce; but this is a long way from holding that the
ordinary process of the courts may not reach corporations carrying on
business within the state which is wholly of an interstate commerce char-
acter. Such corporations are within the state, receiving the protection of
its laws, and may, and often do, have large properties located within the
state. . . . [Speaking of a prior case], "and it was recognized that the
states may pass laws enforcing the rights of citizens which affect interstate
commerce but fall short of regulating such commerce in the sense in which
the constitution gives sole jurisdiction to Congress. ...
(P. 589) : "We are satisfied that the presence of a corporation within
a state necessary to the service of process is shown when it appears that the
corporation is there carrying on business in such sense as to manifest its
presence within the state, although the business transacted may be entirely
interstate in its character. In other words, this fact alone does not render
the corporation immune from the ordinary process of the courts of the
state."
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corporations, and the power to regulate is a power of equal dignity
with the power to exclude. If Congress has permitted such cor-
porations to be sued locally, the matter is settled, but in the absence
of Congressional action there is good reason to apply the general
foreign corporation process statutes to federally incorporated
corporations.120  Of course, there is an additional difficulty pre-
sented here by the doctrine of governmental immunity to suit, and
it is probable that wherever there is a reasonable chance that the
federal corporation is engaged in a governmental function or in
executing one of the admitted powers of the federal government,
the corporation will claim immunity under such a doctrine.1 21
But if the federal government is increasingly to control economic
life through the medium of federally organized or incorporated
corporations, the reasons and policy for applying such process
statutes to such federal corporations are compelling.
z
2 OThe Alabama statutes make special provisions for service upon cor-
porations chartered federally. See Alabama, Code 1928, sec. 9430-9431. In
the case of a corporation organized under the laws of the .United States
government, without a known place of business within the state, the clerk
of court, within thirty days of service, sends to the defendant by registered
mail, postage prepaid, marked for delivery only to the person to whom
addressed and return receipt demanded, addressed to the clerk or register
of the court in which the case is pending.
12'The Supreme Court has given some indication that it will apply the
ordinary rules of suability to such corporations, in the absence of congres-
sional direction. See Sloan Shipyards Corp. et al. v. United States Fleet
Corporation, (1922) 258 U. S. 549, 566, 42 Sup. Ct. 386, 66 L. Ed. 762: "These
provisions sufficiently indicate the enormous powers ultimately given to the
Fleet Corporation. They have suggested the argument that it was so far
put in the place of the sovereign as to share the immunity of the sovereign
from suits otherwise than as the sovereign allows. But such a notion is a
very dangerous departure from one of the first principles of our system
of law. The sovereign properly so called is superior to suit for reasons thmt
often have been explained. But the general rule is that any person within
the jurisdiction always is amenable to the law. If he is sued for conduct
harmful to the plaintiff his only shield is a constitutional rule of law that
exonerates him. Supposing the powers of the Fleet Corporation to have been
given to a single man we doubt if anyone would contend that the acts of
Congress and the delegations of authority from the President left him any
less liable than other grantees of the power of eminent domain to be called
upon to defend himself in court. An instrumentality of government he might
be and for the greatest ends, but the agent, because he is agent, does not
cease to be answerable for his acts ...
(P. 567-568): "The plaintiffs are not suing the United States but the
Fleet Corporation, and if its act was unlawful, even if they might have sued
the United States, they are not cut off from a remedy against the agent that
did the wrongful act. In general the United States cannot be sued for a
tort, but its immunity does not extend to those that acted in its name."
